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SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION CASES IN THE EASTERN
DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
Peter J. Ausili, Esq.'
I. INTRODUCTION
In federal court, summary judgment motions are governed
largely by Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(FRCP) and the cases construing this provision. Summary
judgment may also be governed by the local rules of the district
court and/or the district judge's individual practices. In the
Eastern District of New York, Local Civil Rule 56.1, as well as
the individual practices of each judge, govern summary judgment
practice.
In employment discrimination cases specific analytical
frameworks have been developed to govern a court's analysis of
evidence whether presented on a motion for summary judgment
or at trial. In my experience with employment discrimination
cases, it is rare for a defendant employer not to move for
summary judgment challenging the plaintiff's claim of invidious
discrimination. Consequently, counsel must understand these
1 Peter J. Ausili is a law clerk to United States District Judge Leonard D.
Wexler of the Eastern District of New York. He was an associate with Veil,
Gotshal & Manges and Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler in New
York City. His practice has included commercial litigation and white-collar
criminal defense. He graduated inagna cwn laude from St. John's University
School of Law in 1989 and was Notes & Comments Editor of the St. John's
Law Review. Mr. Ausili is a member of the Eastern District's Committee on
Civil Litigation and director of the Suffolk County Bar Association (SCBA),
where he is a former co-chair of the Labor & Employment Law Committee,
former Co-Chair of the Federal Court Committee, Assistant Legal Articles
Editor of the SUFFOLK LAWYER (an SCBA publication), and an Officer of the
SCBA's Academy of Law. Mr. Ausili has lectured extensively on federal
courts and federal practice and has published various articles on federal courts
and federal practice in the SUFFOLK LAWYER and NEW YORK LAW JOURNAL.
He also frequently lectures and writes on other topics, such as products
liability and legal writing.
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various provisions and the analytical frameworks to successfully
bring or defend an employment discrimination case.
This article will discuss these provisions and analytical
frameworks in some detail focusing on both the technical and
practical considerations for bringing or defending a motion for
summary judgment. In addition, because a district judge may
refer a summary judgment motion to a magistrate judge for
determination or the parties may consent to a magistrate judge for
all purposes in the action (including trial), I will also briefly
discuss the role of a magistrate judge in summary judgment
practice.
II. RULE 56 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE
A. General Principles
1. Standard and Burdens on Summary Judgment Motion
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP)
establishes the following standard governing summary judgment
motions: "The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.",2 The
moving party has the initial burden of demonstrating, with or
without supporting affidavits, the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact.3 The nonmoving party may defeat the summary
judgment motion by producing evidence sufficient to establish a
genuine issue of material fact. 4 "Conclusory allegations,
2 FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
3 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Gallo v. Prudential
Residential Servs., Ltd. Partnership, 22 F.3d 1219, 1223 (2d Cir. 1994).
4 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23 (stating "In our view, the plain language of
Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment... against a party who
fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element
essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of
proof at trial."). See also Gallagher v. Delaney, 139 F.3d 338, 345 (2d Cir.
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conjecture, and speculation, however, are insufficient to create a
genuine issue of fact."5
The moving party may obtain summary judgment by showing
that "little or no evidence" may be found in support of the
nonmoving party's case.6 In other words, "[t]here must either be
a lack of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position, or the
evidence must be so overwhelmingly tilted in one direction that
any contrary finding would constitute clear error." 7 "[W]hen no
rational jury could find in favor of the nonmoving party because
the evidence to support its case is so slight, there is no genuine
issue of material fact and a grant of summary judgment is
proper."
Although it has been recognized that summary judgment is a
"drastic procedural weapon because 'its prophylactic function,
when exercised, cuts off a party's right to present his case to the
jury,' ' 9 the United States Supreme Court has recognized that
"[s]ummary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a
disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of
the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed 'to secure the
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.'""'
1998) (stating that "If a reasonable jury might evaluate the evidence to find the
material propositions of fact a plaintiff must prove, summary judgment
dismissing her suit must be denied.").
5 Kerzer v. Kingly Mfg., 156 F.3d 396, 400 (2d Cir. 1998); D'Amico v. City
of New York, 132 F.3d 145, 149 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 911
(1998). See, e.g., Fagan v. New York State Elec. & Gas Corp., 186 F.3d
127, 134 (2d Cir. 1999) (affirming grant of summary judgment on age
discrimination claim, holding that plaintiff employee's "unparticularized
characterization that his job responsibilities were 'effectively' reassigned to
three younger employees" was "too vague to create a genuine issue as to how
his work was reassigned.").
6 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325.
7 Danzer v. Norden Systems, Inc., 151 F.3d 50, 54 (2d Cir. 1998).
8 Gallo, 22 F.3d at 1224. See Dister v. Continental Group, Inc., 859 F.2d
1108, 1114 (2d Cir. 1988). See also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). "Where the record taken as a whole
could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is
no 'genuine issue for trial.'" Id.
9 Garza v. Marine Tramp. Lines, Inc., 861 F.2d 23, 26 (2d Cir. 1988)
(quoting Donnelly v. Guion, 467 F.2d 290, 291 (2d Cir. 1972)).
'0 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 1).
2000 1405
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2. Court's Role on Summary Judgment Motion
The court's role on a summary judgment motion is limited to
"discerning whether there are any genuine issues of material fact
to be tried, not to deciding them."" In so doing, the court must
construe the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving
party, resolving all ambiguities and drawing all reasonable
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.
12
3. Employment Discrimination Cases
In an employment discrimination case discriminatory intent
generally is the central issue.' 3  The determination of intent
typically presents an issue of fact for a jury.14 Given this reality,
the Second Circuit has repeatedly emphasized that "in an
employment discrimination case when. . . the employer's intent
is at issue, the trial court must be especially cautious about
granting summary judgment." 15  Nevertheless, a plaintiff
employee, as a nonmoving party, must present sufficient
evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to the
elements of the claim.16 To do so, the plaintiff employee can
present direct, circumstantial, or statistical evidence to establish
genuine issues of material fact. 17 However, as in other
" Gallo, 22 F.3d at 1224. See also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 249 (1986). On summary judgment motion, the "judge's function
is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but
to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Id.
12 Id. at 255. See Gallo, 22 F.3d at 1223. See also Donohue v. Windsor
Locks Bd. of Fire Comm'rs, 834 F.2d 54, 57 (2d Cir. 1987).
13 Gill v. Reorganized School District R-6, 32 F.3d 376, 378 (8th Cir. 1994).
14 Malladi v. Brown, 987 F. Supp. 893, 921 (D. Ala. 1997).
'5 Kerzer v. Kingly Mfg., 156 F.3d 396, 400 (2d Cir. 1998); Gallo, 22 F.3d
at 1224. See also Gallagher v. Delaney, 139 F.3d 338, 345 (2d Cir. 1998).
"The dangers of robust use of summary judgment to clear trial dockets are
particularly acute in current sex discrimination cases." Id.
16 See Ray v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 63 F.3d 429, 434 (5th Cir. 1995).
17 See Kerzer, 156 F.3d at 401. See, e.g., Stratton v. Department for the
Aging, 132 F.3d 869, 876-77 (2d Cir. 1997) (upholding the admissibility of
organizational charts showing ages of defendant employer's senior staff before
1406 [Vol 16
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substantive areas, "[c]onclusory allegations, conjecture, and
speculation... are insufficient to create a genuine issue of
fact."1 8 Thus, absent sufficient evidence to support a reasonable
finding of discriminatory intent, summary judgment is
appropriate. 19
B. Partial Summary Judgment
A party may move for summary judgment on some, but not all,
of the claims or defenses in an action, i.e., for "partial summary
judgment." 20  Moreover, the rule expressly provides that the
and after new commissioner was appointed, which indicated a drop in the
average age after appointment, and noting relevance and admissibility of
statistics to support not only disparate impact case but also disparate treatment
claim involving single plaintiff.) See also Hollander v. American Cyanamid
Co., 172 F.3d 192, 202 (2d Cir. 1999). "As this court has held in several
cases, disparate treatment plaintiffs may introduce statistics as circumstantial
evidence of discrimination." Id.
"s Kerzer, 156 F.3d at 400. See D'Amico v. City of New York, 132 F.3d
145, 149 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 911 (1998). See also Meiri v.
Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 998 (2d Cir. 1985). Although Meiri alleged that
'Dacon conspired to get rid of her'; that he 'misconceived her work habits
because of his subjective prejudice against her Jewishness'; and that she 'heard
disparaging remarks about Jews, but, of course, don't ask me to pinpoint
people, times or place .... It's all around us,' such conclusory allegations of
discrimination are insufficient to satisfy the requirements of Rule 56(e). Id.
19 See, e.g., Barth v. CBIS Federal, Inc., 849 F. Supp. 864, 870 (E.D.N.Y.)
(stating that circumstances of plaintiff's discharge were insufficient to raise
inference of age discrimination), aff'd, 43 F.3d 1458 (2d Cir. 1994). See also
Gallo, 22 F.3d at 1224. "When no rational jury could find in favor of the
nonmoving party because the evidence to support its case is so slight, there is
no genuine issue of material fact and a grant of summary judgment is proper."
Id.; Danzer v. Norden Systems, Inc., 151 F.3d 50, 54 (2d Cir. 1998). "There
must either be a lack of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position, or the
evidence must be so overwhelmingly tilted in one direction that any contrary
finding would constitute clear error." Id.; Kerzer, 156 F.3d at 400; Dister v.
Continental Group, Inc., 859 F.2d 1108, 1114 (2d Cir. 1988).20 Advanced Semiconductor Materials America v. Applied Materials, No. C-
93-20853 RMW, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22123, at 6 (N.D. Ca. July 7, 1995)
(citing FED R. Crv. P. 56 (a)). See also State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v.
Geary, 699 F. Supp. 756, 759 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (stating "Partial summary
judgement that falls short of a final determination, even of a single claim, is
authorized by Rule 56 in order to limit the issues to be tried.")
2000 1407
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court may enter summary judgment on the issue of liability
although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
21
In situations where judgment is not rendered on the whole case or
for all the relief sought, the court may streamline the trial by
ascertaining and rendering an order specifying those material
facts that are "without substantial controversy., 22 At trial, those
material facts will be deemed established.23
In employment discrimination cases, it is common for a
defendant employer to move for summary judgment focusing
only on the issue of liability, i.e., whether the employer
discriminated or not.24 Similarly, plaintiff employees sometimes,
though rarely, move for summary judgment on liability while
leaving the issue of damages for later determination. 25  Since
plaintiff employees frequently join supplemental state claims with
federal employment discrimination claims,26 defendant's counsel
must consider whether to seek summary judgment on some or all
of the supplemental state claims when seeking summary judgment
on the federal claims. Obviously, to the extent a state claim
mirrors a federal claim,27 counsel should move as to both claims.
Otherwise, counsel may choose to move against the federal
claims and seek dismissal of the supplemental state claims should
the federal claims be dismissed.28
21 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
22 FED. R. CIv. P. 56(d).
2 Id.
24Advanced, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22123, at 6 (stating "Rule 56(c) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure clearly allows a party to bring a motion for
summary judgement 'on the issue of liability alone.'")
2' See id.
26 See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1994).
27 See, e.g., Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1176, 1180 (2d Cir.
1992). The elements of proof for claim under New York Human Rights Law
§ 297(9), N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(9) are the same as those for claim under Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).
28 See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (providing that district court may decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim if the district court dismissed
all claims over which it had original jurisdiction).
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C. Timing of Summary Judgment Motions
1. General Principles
A defending party may move for summary judgment at any
time after the action is commenced. 29 However, a plaintiff must
wait twenty days from the date of commencement of the action or
after service of a summary judgment motion by a defending party
before making a summary judgment motion. 3The rule provides
that the moving party's papers must be served at least ten days
before the hearing on the motion, while the opposing party may
serve opposing affidavits prior to the day of the hearing.3'
2. Employment Discrimination Cases
Determining when to make a summary judgment motion is an
important decision in any action. In employment discrimination
cases, where the issue is whether the employer discriminated or
not, the defendant employer normally will, and generally should,
wait until the close of discovery before bringing a summary
judgment motion. Having already established that the issue of
discriminatory intent generally is the central issue in employment
discrimination cases, summary judgment generally is not
appropriate until both parties, the plaintiff in particular, have
been allowed an adequate opportunity for discovery. A
premature motion for summary judgment is likely to be met with
an objection that there has not been sufficient opportunity for
discovery.32
Certain dispositive issues may, if based on undisputed facts,
lend themselves to summary judgment early in the action. For
example, the defendant employer may contend that the plaintiff
employee executed a release thereby barring the action or a
particular claim. There may or may not be disputed factual
issues concerning the release and either party may seek an early
29 FED. R. CIv. P. 56(b).
30 FED. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
31 FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).32 See FED. R. Crv. P. 56(0.
2000 1409
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determination by the court as to whether there are genuine issues
of material fact regarding the validity of the release.
33
3. Eastern District Practice
In the Eastern District, a magistrate judge (as discussed below)
generally presides over discovery and other pretrial matters.
Pursuant to FRCP 16(b) 34 and Local Civil Rule 16.2," the
magistrate judge will issue a pretrial order shortly after the action
is commenced providing, among other things, a limit on the time
to make pretrial motions including motions for summary
judgment. The date will generally be set at or around the
discovery cutoff date. Even if no cutoff date is fixed for motion
practice, counsel should be cautious not to wait too long from the
close of discovery to either make the motion or to request a pre-
motion conference before making the motion. Additionally, most
of the Eastern District's judges require a pre-motion conference
before a party may move for summary judgment. If counsel
delays there may be insufficient time before trial to completely
brief and submit the motion to the court for adequate
consideration before trial unless counsel can persuade the court to
adjourn the trial date. Counsel should consult with the district
judge's case manager/courtroom deputy as to the judge's trial
calendar.
33 See, e.g., Butcher v. Gerber Prods. Co., 8 F. Supp. 2d 307, 309 (S.D.N.Y.
1998) (granting plaintiffs employees' motion for summary judgment as to
enforceability of release of employees' Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (ADEA) claim where release held invalid under Older Workers Benefit
Program Act (OWBPA)); Connors v. Miller Adver. Agency, Inc., 1997 WL
1102028, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 1997) (denying defendant employer's
motion for summary judgment as to enforceability of release); Joseph v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, N.A., 751 F. Supp. 31, 33-36 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (granting
defendant employer's motion for summary judgment dismissing employment
discrimination claims based on release where employee failed to show
economic duress sufficient to invalidate release).
34 FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b).
" U.S. Dist. Ct. Rules S.&E.D.N.Y., Civil Rule 16.2 (1999).
[Vol 161410
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D. Adequate Discovery and Unavailability of Affidavits
Where a nonmoving party can show that it is unable to present
by affidavit facts essential to oppose a summary judgment
motion, the court may deny the motion or order a continuance to
permit further time for discovery and to procure affidavits. 6 To
invoke this provision, counsel should, in response to the
summary judgment motion, move for a continuance supported by
affidavits.37 To make the necessary showing, the Second Circuit
requires that the supporting affidavit explain, "(1) what facts are
sought and how they are to be obtained, (2) how those facts are
reasonably expected to create a genuine issue of material fact, (3)
what effort the affiant has made to obtain them, and (4) why the
affiant was unsuccessful in those efforts." 38 Indeed, the failure to
file such an affidavit is fatal to a request for a continuance to
obtain discovery even if the nonmoving party refers to the need
for discovery in a memorandum of law. 39 Thus, absent a proper
FRCP 56(f) affidavit, counsel risks being denied further
discovery prior to the district court's ruling on the motion for
summary judgment.40
Given these requirements, the nonmoving party cannot rely on
mere assertions that it needs additional discovery, that discovery
is ongoing, or that the matter sought is within defendant's
knowledge or possession. If, for instance, the nonmoving party
claims that it needs certain discovery, it must explain the facts
that are sought and the type of discovery it requires (e.g.,
36 FED. R. Civ. P. 56(f).
37 See FED. R. Civ. P. 56(f); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 326.
38 Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, Inc. v. Department of Navy, 891 F.2d
414, 422 (2d Cir. 1989). See also Meloff v. New York Life Ins. Co., 51
F.3d 372, 375 (2d Cir. 1995); Jones v. Long Island Railroad, 1998 WL
221365, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. May 1, 1998); Davis v. Goode, 995 F. Supp. 82, 91
(E.D.N.Y. 1998).
39 See Paddington Partners v. Bouchard, 34 F.3d 1132, 1137 (2d Cir. 1994).40See, e.g., Shafik v. City of New York, 1996 WL 14060, at *1 (2d Cir. Jan.
12, 1996) (unpublished summary order). "In the absence of an affidavit
pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 56(f) affidavit, the district court was not required
to order further discovery prior to ruling on defendants' motion for summary
judgment." Id.
2000 1411
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depositions of specific witnesses or responses to specific
document requests or interrogatories), why that discovery has not
already been sought, and how that discovery is expected to create
genuine issues of fact. 41 As a practical matter, the nonmoving
party should attach copies of the proposed requests to the
affidavit. Similarly, if the nonmoving party contends that it has
outstanding discovery requests that have not been responded to, it
should attach copies of those requests. Additionally, if the
nonmoving party contends that responses to its requests were
inadequate to facilitate a response to the motion such party should
attach its requests and responses with an explanation as to their
inadequacy.
The moving party may respond to the nonmoving party's
continuance request by, inter alia, showing that the nonmoving
party unreasonably delayed in seeking the purportedly necessary
discovery, that the discovery requested could not be expected to
raise genuine issues of material fact, or that the issues to be
determined are based purely on questions of law or uncontested
facts.
42
As discussed previously, summary judgment in an employment
discrimination case generally is not appropriate until the parties,
particularly the plaintiff, have been allowed an adequate
opportunity for discovery.43 Accordingly, counsel for a plaintiff
4' Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986) (stating "Rule
56(e) provides that, when a properly supported motion for summary
judgement is made, the adverse party 'must set forth specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial.'"). See also Sanders v. Quikstak, Inc.,
889 F. Supp. 128, 132 (1995).
42 id.
43 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250 n.5 (stating "This requirement in turn is
qualified by Rule 56(f)'s provision that summary judgement be refused where
the nonmoving party has not had the opportunity to discover information that
is essential to his opposition. In our analysis here, we assume that both parties
have had ample opportunity for discovery.'"). See also Dasher v. New York
City Police Department, No. 94 CV 3847 SJ, 1999 WL 184118, at 1
(E.D.N.Y. March 18, 1999) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250, which stated
that "[o]nce the movant has come forward with appropriate support
demonstrating that there is no genuine issue of material fact to be tried, the
burden shifts to the nonmoving party to present similar support setting forth
specific facts about which a genuine triable issue remains.").
[Vol 161412
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employee should be prepared to make the required showing if the
defendant employer brings the motion prematurely or if further
discovery is needed to oppose the motion.
44
E. Affidavits on Summary Judgment Motions
1. Need for Affidavits
FRCP 56(e) provides that when a motion for summary
judgment is made and supported with affidavits, an adverse party
may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse
party's pleading. 45 The adverse party's response must, by
affidavit or otherwise, set forth specific facts showing that there
is a genuine issue for trial. 6 The court may permit affidavits to
be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to
interrogatories, or further affidavits.
47
2. Personal Knowledge and Facts Admissible in Evidence
FRCP 56(e) requires that supporting and opposing affidavits be
made on "personal knowledge, shall set forth facts as would be
admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein."4 8 A
court may "strike" portions of an affidavit that are "not based
upon the affiant's personal knowledge, contain inadmissible
44 See, e.g., Meloff v. New York Life Ins. Co., 51 F.3d 372, 375 (2d Cir.
1995) (holding plaintiff employee's affidavit sufficient under FED. R. Cri. P.
56(f) and district court's grant of summary judgment for employer premature,
where affidavit explained that plaintiff received documents and interrogatories
from employer only two days before response to summary judgment motion
was due and requested opportunity to take depositions and seek further
discovery).45 FED. R. CIv. P. 56(e).
46 Id.
4 7 id.
48 Id. See, e.g., Schwapp v. Town of Avon, 118 F.3d 106, 111 (2d Cir.
1997) (finding that the district court erred in excluding evidence presented in
affidavit where affiant's recount of event was based on personal knowledge
and sufficiently particular to satisfy FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).
2000 1413
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hearsay or make generalized and conclusory statements. ' 49
Significantly, the district court's decision to strike will not be
disturbed on appeal unless "manifestly erroneous."
50
Counsel must object, i.e., move to strike evidence submitted on
the motion that it claims is inadmissible under the Federal Rules
of Evidence or Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.5 ' If a party fails
to move to strike the affidavit, the defect is waived and the court
may consider the evidence.5 2 Moreover, "even if a motion to
strike is made, it will be ineffective unless it identifies the defects
in the affidavit under attack with adequate specificity." 53
FRCP 56(e) further requires that "[s]worn or certified copies
of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be
attached thereto and served therewith." 54 Thus, to be admissible,
"documents must be authenticated by and attached to an affidavit
that meets the requirements of Rule 56(e)." 55 Generally, the
49 Hollander, 172 F.3d at 198 (upholding, in employment discrimination
action, district court's grant of motion to strike portions of plaintiff
employee's affidavit which was "'riddled with inadmissible hearsay,
conclusory statements and arguments, and information clearly not made on the
affiant's personal knowledge,' and 'more resemble[d] an adversarial
memorandum than a bona fide affidavit'"); Morris v. Northrop Grumman
Corp., 37 F. Supp. 2d 556, 567-69 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (refising, on summary
judgment motion in employment discrimination action, to consider portions of
affidavits containing hearsay statements not within hearsay exception,
conclusory allegations, legal arguments, and statements not based upon
personal knowledge).
50 Hollander v. American Cyanamide Co., 172 F.3d 192, 198 (2d Cir. 1999).
5' See DeCintio v. Westchester County Med. Ctr., 821 F.2d 111, 114 (2d Cir.
1987).
52 Id. See Teltronics Servs., Inc.v. Hessen, 762 F.2d 185, 192 (2d Cir. 1985).
See also Starter v. Converse, Inc., 1996 WL 706837, at *1 n.1 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 3, 1996) (holding "a party must move to strike an affidavit that violates
FED. R. Civ. P. . 56(e) ... if no such motion is made, the party waives
objection to the affidavit and the Court may consider the affidavit in absence
of 'a gross miscarriage of justice.'").
" DeCintio, 821 F.2d at 114. See, e.g., Perma Research & Dev. Co. v.
Singer Co., 410 F.2d 572, 579 n.10 (2d Cir.1969) (noting that "motion to
strike was much too general in that it did not specify which parts of the
[challenged] affidavit should be stricken and why.").
14 FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
55 National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Miller, 1989 WL 39677, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 14, 1989).
[Vol 161414
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affiant must authenticate the documents by identifying and
qualifying them as admissible evidence.
56
3. Form of Affidavit
The affidavit should identify the affiant, state the reason the
affidavit is being submitted, and then present the affiant's
statement in a clear and logical order, demonstrating the
relevance of the matter asserted and the relevance, authenticity
and admissibility of documents submitted, attaching those
documents to the affidavit. Although the affidavit should be
drafted by counsel, it should accurately reflect the affiant's
statement and be written in the affiant's voice.57 Should the
matter proceed to trial, a trial witness's affidavit is open for
cross-examination.58
4. Attorney's Affidavit (Affirmation)
Because an affidavit must be based on personal knowledge, an
attorney's affidavit or affirmation59 is not a "competing"
affidavit. 60 Generally, it is inappropriate for an attorney to
present legal arguments in the attorney's affidavit or to make
56 See Miller v. Hotel, Motel & Restaurant Employees & Bartenders Union,
Local 471, 1990 WL 134847, at *12, n.6 (N.D.N.Y. Sep 17, 1990); National
Union Fire Ins. Co., 1989 WL 39677, at *2; In re Teltronics Servs., Inc., 18
B.R. 705, 707 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
57 Chemical Bank v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. No. 78 Civ. 34748
KTD, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13165, at 5 (S.D.N.Y. April 9, 1979).5 1 Id. at8.
59 28 U.S.C. § 1746 (1994). In practice, an attorney's submission typically
will be made by unsworn "affirmation" rather than a sworn affidavit. Indeed,
with limited exception, any witness may submit an "unsworn declaration,
certificate, verification, or statement" made "under penalty of perjury" as to
"any matter... required or permitted to be supported, evidenced,
established, or proved by... sworn declaration, verification, certificate,
statement, oath, or affidavit." Id.
60 See, e.g., Attorney General v. Irish Northern Aid Comm., 668 F.2d 159,
162 (2d Cir.1982) (holding attorney's "conclusory affidavit," admittedly not
based on personal knowledge, insufficient to create genuine issue of material
fact to defeat summary judgment motion).
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factual assertions on the subject matter of the action.1 On a
summary judgment motion, an attorney's affidavit should be used
only to present the relevant procedural background and various
matters such as pleadings, deposition excerpts, and responses to
interrogatories and requests to admit. Thus, the attorney's
affidavit should (1) identify the attorney and the party whom the
attorney represents; (2) succinctly explain the reason the affidavit
is being submitted to the court and the procedural background as
necessary for the motion; and (3) identify the relevant matter
attached for consideration with the motion.62
5. Employment Discrimination Cases
Affidavits are usually critical to a plaintiff employee's
successful defense of a summary judgment motion in an
employment discrimination case. 63 In such cases, as in other areas
of law, competing affidavits generally will defeat a summary
judgment motion. 64 Obviously, the plaintiff's affidavit is critical.
However, an affidavit of a disinterested nonparty, particularly a
non-disgruntled former employee, will likely be viewed more
favorably. For example, in Kerzer, the Second Circuit reversed
a district court's award of summary judgment for a defendant
former employer in a pregnancy discrimination claim. The court
based its determination on the plaintiff former employee's
affidavit and a third-party affidavit despite the fact that plaintiff's
"evidence... pales in volume and comparison to the numerous
61 See id.
62FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
63 See, e.g., Kerzer v. Kingly Mfg., 156 F.3d 396, 401; Danzer v. Norden
Sys., Inc., 151 F.3d 50, 57 (2d Cir. 1998); Schwapp v. Town of Avon, 118
F.3d 106, 111 (2dCir. 1997).
64 Sean Mossman v. Transamerica Insurance Company, 816 F. Supp. 633, 636
n.8 (D. Haw. 1993) (citing T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec.
Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626 (9h Cir. 1987)). "However, when 'direct
evidence' produced by the moving party conflicts with 'direct evidence'
produced by the party opposing summary judgement, 'the judge must assume
the truth of the evidence set forth by the non-moving party with respect to that
fact.'" Id.
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[defendant] affidavits."6 ' Through the affidavits, the employee
presented both direct and circumstantial evidence which raised
genuine issues of material fact as to whether the employer
replaced her with a nonpregnant employee and whether her
discharge occurred under circumstances giving rise to an
inference of discrimination. 66
However, as previously discussed, affidavits can only be
sufficient to overcome summary judgment if they are based on
personal knowledge and are not conclusory. 67 For example, in
Danzer, the Second Circuit reversed a district court's award of
summary judgment to the defendant former employer in an age
discrimination claim where the plaintiff former employee
apparently relied exclusively on his own affidavit.68 Over the
defendant's contention that the affidavit was "self-serving" and
"conclusory," the court found no "evidentiary infirmity" in the
plaintiffs affidavit which "chronicled in depth the various
episodes giving rise to his suit" and rejected defendant's
argument that the plaintiff's affidavit was insufficient. 69 For
instance, the affidavit, among other things, rebutted one of the
employer's proffered nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating
him, i.e., that the employee's job performance had deteriorated
and had become unacceptable because he was not bringing in new
business.70 In his affidavit, the employee denied that his actual
performance had declined and stated that the employer caused the
poor performance-by denying him funding necessary to generate
new business. 71 The employee also overcame another reason for
his termination, i.e., that the employee was "downsized" as part
of a reduction in force ("RIF"). Although the employee admitted
that he was let go as part of a RIF and was not replaced, the
court found the evidence sufficient to raise an issue as to whether
61Kerzer, 156 F.3d at 401.
6 See id. at 401-02.
6 Danzer, 151 F.3d at 57 n.7.
68 See id. at 57.
69 id.
70 d. at 54-55.
71 Id.
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the selection of the employee as part of the RIF was influenced
by his age.72
Affidavits are also useful to the defendant employer,
particularly for proffering the legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for the employment action. Generally, the most important
affidavits are those of the responsible decision-makers. Just as a
jury would be skeptical if the defendant failed to call the
decision-maker as a witness at trial, a judge would likely be
skeptical if the defendant failed to proffer the decision-maker's
affidavit on summary judgment.
6. Contradicting Deposition. Testimony
Another important point counsel must consider when proffering
an affidavit is that it is well established in the Second Circuit that
a nonmoving party "may not create an issue of fact precluding
summary judgment by offering an affidavit that contradicts his
earlier sworn testimony in the case." 73 However, a material issue
of fact may be established by subsequent sworn testimony that
"amplifies or explains, but does not merely contradict," prior
testimony, "especially where the party was not asked sufficiently
precise questions to elicit the amplification or explanation. '" 74
Provided there is a plausible explanation for the discrepancies in
72Id. at 55.
73 Langman Fabrics v. Graff Californiawear, Inc., 160 F.3d 106, 112 (2d Cir.
1998) (citing Mack v. United States, 814 F.2d 120, 124-25 (2d Cir.1987) and
Trans-Orient Marine Corp. v. Star Trading & Marine, Inc., 925 F.2d 566,
572 (2d Cir.1991)), aniended by 169 F.3d 782 (2d Cir. 1998). See also
Raskin v. Wyatt Co., 125 F.3d 55, 63 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that plaintiff
employee's affidavit stating that decisionmaker made certain statement at
meeting could not raise issue of fact on motion for summary judgment because
affidavit contradicted earlier deposition testimony by plaintiff that he could not
remember points covered at meeting); Miller v. International Telephone &
Telegraph Corp., 755 F.2d 20, 24 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that plaintiff's
deposition testimony that he received oral notice of termination of employment
on specified date "could not later be contradicted for the purpose of creating
an issue of fact" on motion for summary judgment where oral notice triggered
running of statute of limitations).
74 Langman Fabrics, 160 F.3d at 112 (citing Rule v. Brine, Inc., 85 F.3d
1002, 1011 (2d Cir. 1996)).
1418 [Vol 16
16
Touro Law Review, Vol. 16 [2000], No. 4, Art. 15
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol16/iss4/15
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
a party's testimony, the court "should not disregard the later
testimony because of an earlier account that was ambiguous,
confusing, or simply incomplete. "
75
Given that a court's suspicion will be heightened when a
plaintiff's affidavit recites facts not testified to at the deposition,
plaintiff's counsel should be prepared to question plaintiff at the
deposition, in order to potentially elicit favorable facts that
plaintiff may have failed to state or to clarify testimony that
plaintiff may have inaccurately stated or unfavorably
characterized.76
F. Bad Faith Affidavit
A court may impose sanctions against any party submitting any
affidavit in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay.77
I. LOCAL CIVIL RULE 56.1
A. Statements of Material Facts
Local Civil Rule 56.1 of the Eastern District of New York
(entitled, "Statements of Material Facts on Motion for Summary
Judgment") 78 provides that on a motion for summary judgment,
the moving party "shall... annex[] to the notice of motion a
separate, short and concise statement of the material facts as to
which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue to be
tried." 79  The statement is not optional. Indeed, the rule
75 id.
76 See generally Langman Fabrics, 160 F.3d at 112 (stating that although
plaintiffs later account was much more detailed than his earlier account, the
additional facts were not inconsistent with the first account. The district court
ordered further discovery, which invited further development of the record by
the parties.)
77 FED. R. Civ. P. 56(g). See also FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (general sancdons
provision).78 Former U.S. Dist. Ct. Rules S.&E.D.N.Y., Civil Rule 3(g) (1999).
79 U.S. Dist. Ct. Rules S.&E.D.N.Y., Civil Rule 56.1(a) (1999).
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provides expressly that "[f]ailure to submit such a statement may
constitute grounds for denial of the motion." 80
The non-moving party is required to file a responding
statement. In this respect, the rule provides that opposing papers
"shall include a separate, short and concise statement of the
material facts as to which it is contended that there exists a
genuine issue to be tried."81 More importantly, any of the
material facts set forth by the moving party are "deemed to be
admitted, unless controverted by the statement required to be
served by the opposing party." 82 The Second Circuit has noted
that "[i]t is well established that if a party fails to object or
respond to the factual assertions in an opposing party's [Local
Civil Rule 56.1] statement, those factual assertions will be
deemed true."
83
B. Content of Statement
Beside requiring that the statement be "short and concise," the
rule requires that "[e]ach statement of material fact by a movant
or opponent must be followed by citation to evidence which
would be admissible, set forth as required by Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 56(e)." 84 Beyond these requirements, however,
the rule provides no further guidance. As a result, the practice
concerning these statements varies greatly. However, better
statements share certain characteristics.
First, absent exceptional circumstances, the moving party's
statement should be five pages or less -- otherwise, it's probably
not "short and concise. " 85 Second, each of the material facts
80 id.
8' U.S. Dist. Ct. Rules S.&E.D.N.Y., Civil Rule 56.1(b) (1999).
82 U.S. Dist. Ct. Rules S.&E.D.N.Y., Civil Rule 56.1(c) (1999).
83 Titan Indem. Co. v. Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Auth., Inc., 135 F.3d
831, 835 (2d Cir.1998).
8U.S. Dist. Ct. Rules S.&E.D.N.Y., Civil Rule 56.1(d) (1999).
81 U.S. Dist. Ct. Rules S.&E.D.N.Y., Civil Rule 56.1(a) (1999). See also
Champion v. Artuz, 76 F.3d 483, 485 (2d Cir. 1996) (per curiam), in which
the court examined in detail the requirement of Rule 56 (e) and stated:
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should be stated in separately numbered paragraphs and, as the
rule requires, followed by a citation to evidence in the record.86
The citation should either specifically identify the referenced
matter (e.g., "Jane Doe Aff. § 6"), or identify lettered or
numbered exhibits attached to the attorney's affidavit or the party
or third-party affidavits (e.g., "Exh. 6, John Doe Tr. 110-13").
Abbreviations to the various sources can be provided in an
introductory paragraph or footnote to the statement. Third, each
of the material facts should accurately state and characterize the
evidence and other matter supporting it. 87  While reasonable
inferences certainly can be argued in the memorandum of law,
counsel loses credibility with the court by inaccurate or
misleading statements or characterizations of the evidence in the
Local Civil Rule 56.1 statement and does not further the client's
interest. Fourth, the nonmoving party's statement should both
directly address each of the moving party's allegations of
undisputed material facts and state the material facts that are in
dispute.88 In this respect, as to each paragraph of the moving
party's statement, the nonmoving party should either agree that it
is undisputed or state that it is disputed and provide citations to
evidence in the record demonstrating the dispute."9  The
[W]hen a motion for summary judgment is made and
properly supported, you may not simply rely upon your
complaint, but you must respond by affidavits or as
otherwise provided in that rule, setting forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact for
trial. Any factual assertions in our affidavits will be
accepted by the District Judge as being true unless you
submit affidavits or other documentary evidence
contradicting out [sic] assertions.
Id.86U.S. Dist. Ct. Rules S.&E.D.N.Y., Civil Rule 56.1(d) (1999).
87 U.S. Dist. Ct. Rules N.D.N.Y., L.R. 7.1(a) (1999), which states that
"failure of the moving party to submit an accurate and complete Statement of
Material Facts shall result in a denial of the motion." Id.
88U.S. Dist. Ct. Rules S.&E.D.N.Y., Civil Rule 56.1(b) (1999).
89 See Davis v. Goode, 995 F.Supp. 82, 86 (E.D.N.Y. 1998). The court
stated:
[O]nce the moving party discharges its burden of proof under
Rule 56(c), the party opposing summary judgment 'has the
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nonmoving party should then present additional material facts
which it contends are in dispute and raise genuine issues to be
tried.9 °
C. Reply Statement
The rule does not provide for a reply statement by the moving
party. However, in practice, the court may allow counsel for the
moving party, upon request, to serve and file a reply statement. 9'
IV. INDIVIDUAL JUDGE'S PRACTICES
A. Model Individual Judge's Practices
In July 1998, the judges of the Eastern District of New York
adopted a "Model for Individual Judge's Practices" 92 to eliminate
burden of coming forward with specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial.' However, Rule 56(e)
'provides that a party opposing a properly supported motion
for summary judgment may not rest upon mere allegations or
denials of his pleading.' Indeed, 'the mere existence of
some alleged factual dispute between the parties' alone will
not defeat a properly supported motion for summary
judgment.
Id.
9U.S. Dist. Ct. Rules S.&E.D.N.Y., Civil Rule 56.1(b) (1999).91Recomnended Model for Individual Judge's Practices (visited September 25,
2000) <http://www.nved.uscourts.gov/motion-practices.pdf> [hereinafter
Recommended Model].92 Deborah Pines, Federal Judges Adopt New Individual Rules, Model Discards
Excess but Pennits Variety, 220 N.Y. L.J. 13 (1998). It was reported:
[F]orty-six district judges - who for years have adopted their
own detailed rules for matters such as how and when lawyers
should contact chambers - changed their rules to make them
simpler and more uniform. Of the group, 14 magistrate
judges and 17 district judges adopted in its entirety a model
set of rules which permits some variations. Another 15
district judges adopted the model with some additions or
reconfigured their own rules to match the sequence in which
the model addresses three subject areas: communications
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the proliferation of disparate individual judge's "rules"
throughout the district.93 The model practices cover three major
areas: (1) communications with chambers, (2) motions, and (3)
pretrial procedures. 94  Many of the provisions include several
alternative versions. With the exception of several judges and
magistrate judges who have opted not to have individual
practices, each judge has selected from the various alternatives.
Attached to the model practices are schedules reflecting each
judge's choices and an information sheet. 95  Note that Senior
District Judges Mishler and Weinstein elected not to have
individual practices as did Chief Magistrate Judge Chrein and
Magistrate Judge Azrack. Copies of the model practices, along
with the schedules and information sheet, can be obtained at the
clerk's offices in Hauppauge, Uniondale, and Brooklyn. In
addition, all of the Eastern District's judges' practices are
published in full in the New York Law Journal's monthly
"Judges' Part Rules." 96  This monthly publication is a
comprehensive listing of rules for all federal courts and state
appellate and supreme courts in the first and second departments.
with chambers, motions and pretrial procedures. Ten district
judges stuck with their existing rules.
Id.
93 Id. The New York Law Journal reported:
[A] turning point. . .came in June 1994 when Manhattan
attorney, Daniel A. Pollack, son of Southern District Judge
Milton Pollack, denounced the rules proliferation at a Second
Circuit Judicial Conference. Waving a phonebook-sized
sheaf of rules, Mr. Pollack question whether the widely
variant individual rules undermined a key Federal Rule
mandating that courts resolve controversies in a just, speedy
and inexpensive manner.
Id.94 Reconmnended Model, supra note 91.
95 See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
96 See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
2000 1423
21
Ausili: Summary Judgement in Employment Discrimination Cases in the Easte
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2000
TOURO LAW REVIEW
B. Motion Practices
The motion practices are relevant to summary judgment
motions. They address pre-motion conferences in civil actions,
courtesy copies, memoranda of law, filing of motion papers, and
oral argument on motions. 
97
C. Pre-Motion Conference
Some judges require a conference before a summary judgment
motion is made while others do not. 98 In fact, some of the judges
require a conference for any dispositive motion, change of venue
motion, and motion to amend a pleading where leave is required,
while others do not require a conference on any motion.99 Thus,
counsel must consult the assigned judge's individual practices
before bringing any motion, particularly one for summary
judgment.100
Where the judge requires a pre-motion conference, counsel is
required to submit a letter to the court not exceeding three pages,
"setting forth the basis for the anticipated motion." 01 Opposing
counsel has seven days to submit a responsive letter not
exceeding three pages. 10 2 The rule does not specify the content
of the letter. However, certain characteristics are found among
better letters. The letter should identify the represented party,
request the conference, state whether the motion is for full or
partial summary judgment, identify the claims or defenses being
97 Recommended Model, supra note 91. Some judges disregard the
requirement of pre-motion conferences altogether. Others require a pre-
motion conference before making a motion for summary judgment in "cases
where the parties are represented by counsel." Others require a pre-motion
conference beforemaking "any dispositive motion, motion for a change of
venue or to amend a pleading pursuant to Rule 15 of the Fed. R. Civ. P.
where leave of court is required." Recommended Model, supra note 91.
98See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
99 See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
'
0o See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
'
1o See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
10 2 See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
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challenged, and succinctly state the grounds for the motion. °3
The last point is the significant one. Better letters will succinctly
state the claims or defenses challenged, the controlling statute
and case law, and the salient undisputed facts warranting
summary judgment.
After receiving the parties' letters, the court will advise counsel
of the conference date and time. 104 Notably absent from the
model practices is any requirement that the Local Civil Rule 56.1
statements be filed with the court at or before the pre-motion
conference which some judges had previously required under
their individual rules.10 5 Be aware that the judge may (and some
do) request that the statements be provided before the
conference. 10 6 Be prepared for such a request or ask the judge's
law clerk if the statements are required at or before the pre-
motion conference.
D. Briefing Schedule
The parties generally are permitted to agree on their own
briefing schedule, either at or after the pre-motion conference, or
the court will impose a briefing schedule. 10 7  The parties
generally are permitted to revise the schedule on consent unless
the court has directed otherwise. The parties should advise the
court of the revised schedule. If counsel is concerned that the
proposed revised schedule may not meet the court's approval
then counsel should first consult the court before agreeing on a
revised schedule.
i03 See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
'04Reconmnended Model, supra note 91. Judges have a choice on whether to
require a statement to be filed with the court at or before the pre-motion
conference. They may choose to do away with the requirement altogether or
require the moving party to "submit a letter not to exceed three (3) pages in
length setting forth the basis for the anticipated motion." Recomnmended
Model, supra note 91.
105 See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
106 See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
107 See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
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E. Filing Motion Papers
As for filing the motion papers, nearly every Eastern District
judge requires that the original moving party file all the motion
papers with the court after the motion is fully briefed.t0 8 Counsel
should file the papers with a cover letter specifying each
document included. All of the district judges require courtesy
copies.1°9 Accordingly, courtesy copies of the motion papers
must be furnished to chambers.
F. Page Limits on Memoranda of Law
In the Eastern District, Local Civil Rule 7.1 requires that a
memorandum of law be submitted in support of or in opposition
to any motion, unless the court directs otherwise. °"0 Indeed,
failure to comply with the rule may be deemed sufficient grounds
for denial of the motion.'' Moreover, counsel should be aware
of page limits on the memoranda of law imposed by the judge.
In this regard, some judges have opted to limit supporting and
opposing memoranda of law to twenty-five pages and reply
memoranda to ten pages, unless the judge grants permission to
exceed the page limits. 112 Generally, there should be no need to
exceed these page limits. However, if counsel anticipates a need
to exceed the limit then counsel should request permission from
the court in advance. 1 3 Such a request can be made at the pre-
motion conference or later by request to the court.11 4 Counsel
should advise opposing counsel that a request will be made
particularly because both parties may desire permission to exceed
1o See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
'
09 See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
"
0 SeeU.S. Dist. Ct. Rules N.D.N.Y., Civil Rule 7.1 (1999).
".Recommended Model, supra note 91. "The court expects counsel to
exercise their professional judgment as to the length of briefs and may impose
limits if that expectation is not met." Recommended Model, supra note 91.
112 Recommended Model, supra note 91. Some courts "expect counsel to
exercise their professional judgment as to the length of briefs and may impose
limits if that expectation is not met." Recommended Model, supra note 91.
113 See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
14 See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
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the page limits; the court is more likely to grant the request if
both parties believe lengthier briefs are required.
Other judges have no page limits, but require that counsel use
reasonable judgment as to the length of legal memoranda.
Counsel should not attempt to evade the page limits on legal
memoranda by presenting legal argument in either counsel's
affidavit or the Local Civil Rule 56.1 statement. Generally,
counsel should not omit the factual statement in a legal
memorandum by incorporating by reference the affidavits and
other matter submitted.115 It is generally preferable to the court
for counsel to set forth the facts in the legal memorandum.
G. Oral Argument
The individual rules also govern oral arguments." 6  Some
judges require an oral argument on all motions, including
summary judgment. These judges will either determine the
argument date and notify the parties, or require the parties to
select a date designated by the judge for hearing oral argument
on motions. Most judges, however, allow counsel to request oral
argument on motions, with the court determining whether
argument will be heard and, if so, when.
A few important points regarding oral arguments: First, consult
the assigned judge's individual practices. If you have a choice,
don't request an oral argument if you feel your position and
papers are particularly strong. However, you may want to
request an oral argument if you can articulate your arguments
persuasively, or if you have concerns about the strength of your
case. The nonmoving party, in particular, may consider
requesting argument to enable counsel to address (or object to)
matter raised for the first time in the moving party's reply
papers. Alternatively, you may consider submitting, with the
court's permission, sur-reply papers to address (or object to)
those matters.
115 See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
116 See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
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V. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION ANALYTICAL
FRAMEWORKS
A. The Two Types of Cases
An employment discrimination action may present a "single
issue motivation case" (also referred to as a "pretext case"' 117) or
a "mixed-motives case." 11 8 The Second Circuit has distinguished
single issue motivation cases from mixed-motives cases as
follows:
Cases in the first category are often called "pretext
cases," because the plaintiff usually challenges the
defendant's proffered assertion of a permissible
reason as a pretext for the impermissible reason of
discrimination.... [H]owever, it might be more
useful to call such cases "single issue motivation
cases," because the fact-finder must decide only
the single issue of whether an impermissible
reason motivated the adverse action. Cases in the
second category are appropriately called "dual
issue motivation cases" because the fact-finder
must decide both the issue of whether the plaintiff
has proved that an impermissible reason motivated
the adverse action and the additional issue of
whether the defendant has proved that it would
have taken the same action for a permissible
'19reason.19
117 Fields v. New York State Office of Mental Retardation & Developmental
Disabilities, 115 F.3d 116, 119, 124 & n.4 (2d Cir. 1997).
118 Stratton v. Department for the Aging, 132 F.3d 869, 878-79 & n.4 (2d Cir.
1997); see Renz v. Grey Advertising, Inc., 135 F.3d 217, 221-23 (2d Cir.
1997); Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1176, 1180-81 (2d Cir.
1992); Harris v. New York City Dep't of Homeless Servs., 1998 WL 205334,
at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 1998), af'd, 1999 WL 314158 (2d Cir. May 14,
1999).
19 Fields, 115 F.3d at 119-20; see also Stratton, 132 F.3d at 878 (comparing
the two types of cases); Fagan v. New York State Elec. & Gas Corp., 1999
WL 557016, slip op. at 11 n.1 (2d Cir. Aug. 2, 1999) (noting that burden-
1428 [Vol 16
26
Touro Law Review, Vol. 16 [2000], No. 4, Art. 15
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol16/iss4/15
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Generally, in single issue motivation cases both sides agree that
there is only one motivation, and the issue in those cases is
whether the motivation was the impermissible reason or the
employer's proffered nondiscriminatory reason.120 An example of
the former is where "the plaintiff claims that he was fired
because of his race, and the employer responds that he was fired
because he was regularly late for work."' 2 1 'If the plaintiff proves
that the adverse action was motivated by race, he has necessarily
disproved that it was motivated by lateness." 12 An example of
the latter is where an employee acknowledges the existence of a
permissible factor (such as lateness) that might have contributed
to the employer's motivation, but contends that an impermissible
factor (such as race) was also a substantial factor of the
motivation. 123
B. Single Issue Motivation Case
A single issue motivation case is analyzed under the three-step,
burden-shifting framework originally enunciated by the Supreme
Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,124 and clarified in
later cases.125 In a discriminatory discharge claim, for example,
shifting analysis that occurs under mixed-motives cases was irrelevant to case
given parties' arguments).
'
20 See id. at 120.
121id.
2 Id.
'
2 5 See id.
124 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). Although the Supreme Court in McDonnell
Douglas established the burden-shifting framework to govern a court's
analysis of evidence presented in an employment discrimination claim under
Title VII, courts, including the Second Circuit, have applied the same
framework to employment discrimination claims under the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act (ADEA) and the American with Disabilities Act (ADA).
See, e.g., Greenway v. Buffalo Hilton Hotel, 143 F.3d 47, 52 (2d Cir. 1998)
(applied to ADA claim); Stratton, 132 F.3d at 878-81 (applied to ADEA
claim).
125 See, e.g., St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510-11 (1993);
Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981);
see also Fisher v. Vassar College, 114 F.3d 1332, 1336 (2d Cir. 1997) (en
banc), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 851 (1998); de la Cruz v. New York City
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the following analysis applies. First, the plaintiff must establish
a "prima facie" case of unlawful discrimination. 12 6 To establish
a prima facie case, the plaintiff must present evidence sufficient
to establish that: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she
performed her job satisfactorily; (3) she was discharged; and (4)
her discharge occurred under circumstances giving rise to an
inference of discrimination. 127 The level of proof a plaintiff is
required to present to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination is "minimal.1 28 For instance, to satisfy the
second element, the employee need not demonstrate that his
performance was "flawless" or "superior," but that he
"'possesses the basic skills necessary for performance of [the]
job.'' 1 29
Second, if the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, then a
"rebuttable presumption" or "rebuttable inference" of
discrimination arises and the burden shifts to the defendant to
"proffer a legitimate non-discriminatory reason" for its
actions.' 30 This step "force[s] the defendant to give an
explanation for its conduct, in order to prevent employers from
simply remaining silent while the plaintiff flounders on the
Human Resources Admin. Dep't of Social Servs., 82 F.3d 16, 20 (2d
Cir. 1996).
126 Stratton, 132 F.3d at 879.
127 Stratton, 132 F.3d at 879. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802;
Hollander v. American Cyanamid Co., 172 F.3d 192, 199 (2d Cir. 1999);
Kerzer v. Kingly Mfg., 156 F.3d 396, 401 (2d Cir. 1998); Grady v. Affiliated
Cent., Inc., 130 F.3d 553, 559 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 349
(1998); Shurnway v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 118 F.3d 60, 63 (2d
Cir.1997); Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., Ltd. Partnership, 22 F.3d
1219, 1224 (2d Cir. 1994).
128 Hollander, 172 F.3d at 199; Fisher, 114 F.3d at 1335, 1340 & n.7; de la
Cruz, 82 F.3d at 20; Chambers v. TRM Copy Ctrs. Corp., 43 F.3d 29, 37 (2d
Cir. 1994); see also Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253 (plaintiff's burden in
establishing prima facie case "is not onerous").
129 de la Cruz, 82 F.3d at 20 (quoting Powell v. Syracuse Univ., 580 F.2d
1150, 1155 (2d Cir. 1978)).
130 Id. at 20; see also Hollander, 172 F.3d at 199 (burden shifts to defendant
to "articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason" for its action).
[Vol 161430
28
Touro Law Review, Vol. 16 [2000], No. 4, Art. 15
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol16/iss4/15
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
difficulty of proving discriminatory intent." 131 In this respect, the
Second Circuit observed in Fisher:
[I]n the absence of a special policy-based rule
similar to that promulgated by McDonnell
Douglas, a plaintiff avoids a directed verdict only
by establishing a prima facie case that assures that
at the end of the trial there will be enough
evidence to support a verdict in his favor (unless
the defendant's evidence conclusively undermines
some element of plaintiff's prima facie case). 132
Because of the Supreme Court's adoption of a particular
framework in McDonnell Douglas and Burdine, the same is not
true of a discrimination case: a plaintiff alleging discrimination
can satisfy the prima facie case and avoid dismissal at the
conclusion of the plaintiff's direct case without submitting
evidence sufficient to support a finding in his favor on each
element that the plaintiff must ultimately prove to win. The
burden-shifting presumption excuses the plaintiff at that stage
from showing that discrimination was present and caused the
adverse employment action plaintiff suffered. If the plaintiff
submits evidence of the minimal elements of the special
discrimination prima facie case-membership in the protected
class, qualification, adverse employment action, and preference
for someone outside the protected class-the remaining elements
(discrimination and causation) are presumed at this stage of the
litigation, and the defendant must take up the burden of going
forward. 133
Notably, however, the defendant's 'burden' is merely to
'articulate' or 'proffer' a reason for its actions. The defendant
need not 'persuade' the factfinder that it was actually motivated
by the proffered reason or reasons. 34
131 Fisher, 114 F.3d at 1335.
I3-d. at 1336.
133 Id. at 1336-37.
'
34 Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254; Fisher, 114 F.3d at 1336.
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Third, if the defendant articulates a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its actions, the presumption of
discrimination is rebutted and "drops out of the picture."' 135 At
that point, the special rules provided by the burden-shifting
framework "drop" from the case. 136 Once the presumption drops
out, the plaintiffs burden is enlarged to include every element of
the claim. Discrimination and cause are no longer presumed. To
sustain the burden of putting forth a case that can support a
verdict in his favor, plaintiff must then (unlike the prima facie
stage) point to sufficient evidence to reasonably support a finding
that he was harmed by the employer's illegal discrimination. 1
37
In other words, once the defendant has offered a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its actions, the plaintiff must show
that the proffered reason is a "pretext" for unlawful
discrimination. 138 A showing of pretext may, but does not
necessarily, serve as evidence that the defendant intentionally
discriminated. 1
39
135 St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 510-11.
136 Fisher, 114 F.3d at 1336.
117 Id. at 1337; Grady, 130 F.3d at 560 (once the presumption drops out, the
plaintiff employee "must present evidence sufficient to allow a rational
factfinder to infer that the employer was actually motivated in whole or in part
by [invidious] discrimination"); see also St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at
515 (a proffered "reason cannot be proved to be 'a pretext for discrimination'
unless it is shown both that the reason was false, and that discrimination was
the real reason"); Kerzer, 156 F.3d at 401 (same).
138 Fisher, 114 F.3d at 1337; Scaria v. Rubin, 117 F.3d 652, 654 (2d Cir.
1997) (holding that plaintiff must point to evidence from which reasonable
factfimder could imply "pretext masking unlawful discrimination"); see also
Hollander, 172 F.3d at 200 ("to survive summary judgment [the plaintiff
employee] had to show not only pretext, but also either use of a pretext that
itself implies a discriminatory stereotype, or use of a pretext to hide age
discrimination.").
"9 Fisher, 114 F.3d at 1338; see, e.g., Fagan, 1999 WL 557016, slip op. at
16 (in affirming grant of summary judgment dismissing discrimination action,
concluding that even if evidence was sufficient for finding of pretext, such
finding did not tend to show discrimination); Scaria, 117 F.3d at 654 (in
affirming grant of summary judgment dismissing discrimination action,
concluding that there was "nothing in the facts from which a reasonable finder
of fact could imply pretext masking unlawful discrimination' in employer's
decision to hire another person rather than plaintiff).
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As explained in Fisher:
The sufficiency of the finding of pretext to support
a finding of discrimination depends on the
circumstances of the case. This is an
unremarkable principle: the sufficiency of any
evidentiary finding depends on the other findings
and evidence that accompany it. What is at issue
is the drawing of inferences from human behavior.
Once the trial has moved to the stage at which the
plaintiff must prove discrimination by a
preponderance of the evidence, a defendant's false
statements are nothing more than pieces of
circumstantial evidence, which may be employed,
as in many other types of cases, to reveal the
speaker's state of mind. To the extent that an
actor in defendant's position is unlikely to have
proffered a false explanation except to conceal a
discriminatory motive, then the false explanation
will be powerful evidence of discrimination. On
the other hand, if the circumstances show that the
defendant gave the false explanation to conceal
something other than discrimination, the inference
of discrimination will be weak or nonexistent. And
if, on examination of the circumstances, there are
many possible reasons for the false explanation,
stated or unstated, and illegal discrimination is no
more likely a reason than others, then the pretext
gives minimal support to plaintiff's claim of
discrimination. 14
0
140 Fisher, 114 F.3d at 1338; see also Grady, 130 F.3d at 560:
Thus, when the district court considers whether the evidence
can support a verdict of discrimination on a motion for
summary judgment, it 'must analyze the evidence, along
with the inferences that may be reasonably drawn from it,
and decide if it raises a jury question as to whether the
plaintiff was the victim of discrimination.'
Id. (quoting Fisher, 114 F.3d at 1347). The burden-shifting framework also
applies to a claim for retaliation, as follows:
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C. Mixed-Motives Case
A plaintiff may attempt to prove discrimination without
proving pretext by proceeding on a 'mixed-motives' theory. The
framework for a mixed-motives case stems largely from Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins,14 1 and Mt. Healthy City School District
Board of Education v. Doyle142 A plaintiff may establish a
'mixed-motives' case by "convinc[ing] the trier of fact that an
impermissible criterion in fact entered into the employment
decision.' 43 To do so, the plaintiff "must initially proffer
evidence that an impermissible criterion was in fact a
'motivating' or 'substantial' factor in the employment
decision." 44 "This burden is greater than the level of proof
necessary to make out a McDonnell Douglas prima facie
case." 1
45
(1) plaintiff must demonstrate a prima facie case of
retaliation, (2) defendant then has the burden of pointing to
evidence that there was a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason
for the complained of action, and (3), if the defendant meets
its burden, plaintiff must demonstrate that there is sufficient
potential proof for a reasonable jury to find the proffered
legitimate reason merely a pretext for impermissible
retaliation.
Gallagher v. Delaney, 139 F.3d 338, 349 (2d Cir. 1998); see also Tomka v.
Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1308 (2d Cir.1995); Fisher, 114 F.3d at 1335.
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, plaintiff must show: "1)
participation in a protected activity known to the defendant; 2) an employment
action disadvantaging the plaintiff, and 3) a causal connection between the
protected activity and the adverse employment action." Gallagher, 139 F.3d
at 349; see also Reed v. A.W. Lawrence & Co., 95 F.3d 1170, 1178 (2d Cir.
1996); Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1308.
141 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
142 429 U.S. 274 (1977). See also Stratton, 132 F.3d at 878 n.4; de la Cruz,
82 F.3d at 23; Tyler, 958 F.2d at 1180-81.
143 Tyler, 958 F.2d at 1181.
'44 de la Cruz, 82 F.3d at 23; see Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258; Tyler,
958 F.2d at 1181.
141 de la Cruz, 82 F.3d at 23; see also Raskin v. Wyatt Co., 125 F.3d 55, 60
(2d Cir. 1997).
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As the Second Circuit explained in Raskin:
Because the plaintiff must show that the evidence
is sufficient to allow a factfinder to infer both
permissible and discriminatory motives, the
plaintiff's initial burden in a Price Waterhouse
mixed-motive case is heavier than the de minimis
showing required to establish a prima facie
McDonnell Douglas case. The types of indirect
evidence that suffice in a pretext case to make out
a prima facie case-or even to carry the ultimate
burden of persuasion-do "not suffice, even if
credited, to warrant" a Price Waterhouse burden
shift. Evidence potentially warranting a Price
Waterhouse burden shift includes, inter alia, policy
documents and evidence of statements or actions
by decisionmakers "that may be viewed as directly
reflecting the alleged discriminatory attitude." In
short, to warrant a mixed-motive burden shift, the
plaintiff must be able to produce a "smoking gun"
or at least a "thick cloud of smoke" to support his
allegations of discriminatory treatment.146
If the plaintiff demonstrates that a discriminatory motive played
such a role in the employment decision (even if a legitimate
motive also existed), the burden of proof shifts to the defendant
to demonstrate that it "would have reached the same decision
even in the absence of the impermissible factor." 147
D. Same Actor Inference
Although the sufficiency of evidence to prove invidious
discrimination depends on the circumstances of each case, certain
'46Raskin, 125 F.3d at 60-61 (citations omitted; emphasis in original).
147 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250; see, e.g., Lightfoot v. Union Carbide
Corp., 110 F.3d 898, 913 (2d Cir.1997) (holding that district court properly
found that plaintiff produced sufficient evidence to warrant a mixed-motive
instruction); see also de la Cruz, 82 F.3d at 23; Tyler, 958 F.2d at 1181.
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factors may suggest that invidious discrimination was unlikely. 148
One such factor is when the plaintiff is hired and fired by the
same decisionmaker. 149 The Second Circuit has recognized that a
"same actor" inference arises in such circumstances:
[W]hen the person who made the decision to fire
was the same person who made the decision to
hire, it is difficult to impute to her an invidious
motivation that would be inconsistent with the
decision to hire. This is especially so when the
firing has occurred only a short time after the
hiring. 150
E. Inexplicable Negative Treatment
On the other hand, certain factors suggest that invidious
discrimination was likely, such as inexplicable negative treatment
of the plaintiff employee.'-" In this regard, the Second Circuit
has recognized that "[a]ctions taken by an employer that
disadvantage an employee for no logical reason constitute strong
evidence of an intent to discriminate."' 5 2 However, the Second
148 Grady v. Affiliated Central, Inc., 130 F.3d 553, 560 (1997).
141 Id. at 560.
150 Grady, 130 F.3d at 560; see, e.g. Renz, 135 F.3d at 224 (harmless error in
instructing jury that employee was required to prove "age was the real reason"
for her discharge, where, inter alia, plaintiff was terminated by same person
who hired her less than two years earlier); Shabazz-Allah v. Guard Mgmt.
Serv., 1999 WL 123641, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 1999) (granting defendant's
motion for summary judgment where plaintiff hired and fired by same person
within two years); Brennan v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 950 F. Supp. 545, 551-
52 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (granting summary judgment on ADEA claim where
plaintiff hired and fired by same individuals and employment with defendants
lasted under three years).
Notably, the Second Circuit recently refused to adopt a rule requiring
district courts to instruct jurors on the availability of the "same actor"
inference. See Banks v. Travelers Cos., 180 F.3d 358, 366-67 (2d Cir.
1999).
151 Stratton, 132 F.3d at 879-80.
152 Id. at 880 & n.6 (evidence of age discrimination included inexplicable
negative treatment of plaintiff after new and substantially younger
commissioner was appointed).
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Circuit also recognizes that "sudden and unexpected downturns
in performance reports cannot, by themselves, provide the basis
for a discrimination action. "153 Nevertheless, evidence of sudden
downturns in evaluations "even if insufficient alone, may
nonetheless work with other submitted proofs (such as biased
remarks) to support a [finding] of discrimination." 154
VI. MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S AUTHORITY REGARDING
SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS
A. Jurisdiction and Powers of Magistrate Judge
In the Eastern District of New York, with certain exceptions,
both a district judge and a magistrate judge are assigned to a civil
action upon commencement.' 55 The jurisdiction and powers of a
magistrate judge in a civil action are largely governed by 28
U.S.C. § 636,156 FRCP 72151 and 73,158 and Local Civil Rules
72.1,159 72.2,161 and 73.1.161 Together, these provisions
determine those matters that may be heard and determined by a
magistrate judge, whether by referral from the district judge or
by consent of the parties.
FRCP 72 addresses court-ordered referrals of
"nondispositive " 162 and "dispositive" 63 matters to magistrate
judges. Magistrate judges generally have jurisdiction (with the
district judge) over any "nondispositive" pretrial matters. 164
153 Danzer v. Norden Systems, Inc., 151 F.3d 50, 56 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing
Viola v. Philips Med. Sys., 42 F.3d 712, 718 (2d Cir. 1994)).
154 Id. (reversing grant of summary judgment where plaintiff's evidence
included sudden deterioration in employee's evaluations).
5 See U.S. Dist. Ct. Rules S.&E.D.N.Y., Civil Rule 72.2(a)(2000)(with
certain exceptions, requiring assignment of a magistrate judge in each case).
156 28 U.S.C. § 636 (2000).
157 FED. R. Civ. P. 72.
158 FED. R. CIV. P. 73.
159 U.S. Dist. Ct. Rules S.&E.D.N.Y., Civil Rule 72.1 (2000).
'6° U.S. Dist. Ct. Rules S.&E.D.N.Y., Civil Rule 72.2 (2000).
161 U.S. Dist. Ct. Rules S.&E.D.N.Y., Civil Rule 73.1 (2000).
162 FED. R. CIv. P. 72(a).
'
63 FED. R. Civ. P. 72(b).
'6 FED. R. Civ. P. 72(a); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (1994).
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Such pretrial matters include those relating to discovery and
issues of relevance and privilege. However, magistrate judges
have jurisdiction to handle dispositive motions, such as motions
for summary judgment under FRCP 56, by referral from the
district judge. 165
In the Eastern District, the practice during the pretrial phase of
civil actions is for the magistrate judge to handle all discovery
and nondispositive pretrial matters; the district judge handles the
dispositive pretrial motions. 66
B. Referral of Summary Judgment Motions
The parties may request that a magistrate judge handle a
summary judgment motion or the district judge may make the
referral without the parties' consent (and even over their
objection), although referrals of summary judgment motions are
not common.' 6 7 The referral order requests the magistrate judge
to hear and determine the motion and issue a recommended
disposition. 68 In such instance, the magistrate judge will prepare
for the district judge proposed findings and recommendation in
the form of a "Report and Recommendation," a so-called
"R&R."
165 FED. R. Civ. P. 72(b); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) (1994).
'6' U.S. Dist. Ct. Rules S.&E.D.N.Y., Civil Rule 72.1(c) (2000) (providing
that "magistrate judges may issue subpoenas, writs of habeas corpus ad
testificandum or ad prosequendum or other orders necessary to obtain the
presence of parties or witnesses or evidence needed for court proceedings, and
may sign in forma pauperis orders").
167 U.S. Dist. Ct. Rules S.&E.D.N.Y., Civil Rule 72.1(d) (2000) (stating that
"[a] magistrate judge may perform any or all of the duties imposed upon a
judge by the rules governing such proceedings in the United States district
courts").
161 U.S. Dist. Ct. Rules S.&E.D.N.Y., Civil Rule 72.1(d) (2000) (providing
that " . . . a magistrate judge may issue any preliminary orders and conduct
any necessary evidentiary hearing or other appropriate proceeding and shall
submit to a judge a report containing proposed findings of fact and
recommendations for disposition of the matter by a judge").
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C. Objection to Magistrate Judge's R&R
The rules provide for objections to the district judge of a
magistrate judge's R&R. 16 9 A party may object to an R&R of a
dispositive motion by serving and filing written objections within
10 days of being served with the R&R. 70 The other party then
has 10 days from service of the objecting party's papers to serve
papers responding to the objections. 17' The rules makes no
provision for reply papers. If counsel desires to serve reply
papers, counsel should request permission from the court (and
anticipate that, if permission is granted, the papers must be short
and filed promptly).
The district judge reviews the R&R "de novo," and may
accept, reject, or modify the R&R, in whole or in part.7 2 As the
R&R should indicate, failure to object precludes any right to
appeal the district court's order. 73 If the magistrate judge has a
less congested docket than the assigned district judge, the
magistrate judge may determine the motion sooner than the
district judge. Nevertheless, final determination of the motion
may then be delayed by objections to the R&R to the district
judge.
D. Consent to Magistrate Judge Trial
Parties to a civil action may consent to have the case handled
by a magistrate judge for all purposes.1 74 By statute, a district
court may, by local rule or order, designate magistrate judges to
169 See FED. R. Civ. P. 72.
170 See FED. R. Civ. P. 72(b); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) (1994).
171 See FED. R. Civ. P. 72(b).
'72 FED. R. Civ. P. 72(b); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) (1994).
173 FED. R. Civ. P. 72(a)(stating that "a party may not thereafter assign as
error a defect in the magistrate judge's order to which objection was not
timely made").
'74 FED. R. Civ. P. 73(a) (providing that "When specially designated to
exercise such jurisdiction by local rule or order of the district court and when
all parties consent thereto...and may conduct any or all proceedings...in a civil
case").
2000 1439
37
Ausili: Summary Judgement in Employment Discrimination Cases in the Easte
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2000
TOURO LAWREVIEW
hear any and all proceedings in jury or nonjury civil actions. 175
The consent to have a case handled by a magistrate judge for all
purposes, confers on the magistrate judge the jurisdiction and
power to handle all pretrial and trial matters in the case. 176 Any
appeal from a final judgment is taken to the court of appeals. 177
In the Eastern District, consistent with this statutory authority,
Local Civil Rule 72.1(a) empowers the district's magistrate
judges to conduct all proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil matter
on consent, and Local Civil Rule 73.1 provides the procedure for
consent. 178 There may be advantages to consenting to a trial
before the magistrate judge. Typically, the parties can obtain a
date certain for trial at an earlier date than available with the
district judge. Moreover, the magistrate judge, having handled
most pretrial matters in the case, may be more familiar with the
case than the district judge.
VII. CONCLUSION
Counsel bringing or defending an employment discrimination
case must be fully familiar with the rules governing summary
judgment. In the Eastern District of New York, counsel must be
familiar with FRCP 56,179 Local Civil Rule 56.1,180 and the
assigned judge's (and magistrate judge's) individual practices.
Moreover, counsel must understand the analytical frameworks
developed to govern the court's analysis of evidence in
employment discrimination action.
175 FED. R. Civ. P. 73(a); 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) (1994).
176 FED. R. Crv. P. 73(a).
177 FED. R. Civ. P. 73(c); 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(3) (1994).
178 See U.S. Dist. Ct. Rules S.&E.D.N.Y., Civil Rule 72.1, 73.1 (2000).
179 FED. R. Civ. P. 56 (setting forth rules for Summary Judgment).
"0 U.S. Dist. Ct. Rules S.&E.D.N.Y., Civil Rule 56.1 (providing rules for
Statements of Material Facts on Motion for Summary Judgment).
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